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I. REPL Y ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In its Respondent's Brief, Critical Access Group, Inc. ("CAG") cited Young v. City of 
Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002) with regard to the standard of review in an 
appeal of the dismissal of a complaint under LR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6). In Young, supra, the Court 
stated: 
When we review an order dismissing a case pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the non-moving party is entitled to have all 
inferences from the record viewed in his favor (Citations 
omitted). 
(Emphasis added). 44 PJd at 1159. CAG has also cited this Court to Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 PJd 758 (2008) for the following proposition: 
After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief 
has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims. 
(Emphasis added). 183 PJd at 761. At CAG's request, counsel for the Appellant, ABC Agra, 
LLC ("ABC") executed a Stipulation to Correct Clerk's Record on Appeal on May 16, 20l3, in 
order to insure that all of CAG's arguments in its various briefs would be included in the 
Clerk's Record. Judge Elgee signed the Order to Correct Clerk's Record on Appeal that same 
date. 
In its briefing to the district court, CAG asserted a legal issue regarding its right to 
enforce certain other covenants in the Option Agreement, as well as an issue regarding the 
applicability of the merger doctrine, (R., pp. 75-77.) These issues will be discussed, infra, at pp. 



























6-7, but in any event, these assertions by CAG are a part of the record in this matter. All 
inferences from the record are to be construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
B. The Need for Adjudication at the Present Time. 
The letter dated February 9, 2012, (R., p. 60), authored by CAG's attorney to ABC is 
pregnant with the creation of uncertainty to warrant a finding of ripeness in this case. The 
following statement is taken from that letter: 
The fact that CAG is aware of your client's previous position 
[regarding the enforceability of the covenant] should not be 
interpreted as a statement that CAG agrees with such positions. 
Id. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from that statement is that CAG did not agree 
with ABC's position, i.e., that the entire 30.53 acres owned by CAG could be used only for 
"healthcare services and facilities." If CAG's response letter was not to be construed as an 
agreement with ABC's stated position regarding the applicability of the covenant, there was 
only one other alternative, i.e., that CAG disagreed with ABC's position. Couple that position 
with CAG's assertions that the doctrine of merger precluded the enforceability of the restrictive 
covenant, but that it could enforce other covenants within 200 feet of its own property, and it is 
abundantly clear that this case is ripe for adjudication. ABC is compelled to refer again to this 
Court's opinion in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989): 
Deferring adjudication would add nothing material to the resolution 
of the legal issues presented, and it would, in fact, delay 
implementation of the agreement. "Generally, in determining 
whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the criteria is whether it 
will clarifY and settle the legal relations at issue, and whether such 
declaration will afford a leave from uncertainty and controversy 
giving rise to the proceeding." Sweeney v. Am. Nat'[ Bk., 62 Idaho 
544, 115 P.2d 109 (1941). Here, nothing can be gained by delaying 



























adjudication of the issue. It is clear that this issue will be before us 
either now or in the future, and a declaration now of the various 
rights of the parties will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty 
and controversy in the future. "Since we are persuaded that 'we will 
be in no better position than we are now' to decide this question, we 
hold that it is presently ripe for adjudication." (Citation omitted). 
778 P.2d at 765. 
As stated in Losser, supra: 
The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. 
183 P .3d at 760-61. This case presents a definite and concrete set of issues; there is a real and 
substantial controversy which exists, at least insofar as ABC is concerned; and there is a present 
need for adjudication of ABC's claim, as well as the issues raised by CAG regarding the 
doctrine of merger and the alleged right of CAG to enforce other restrictive covenants within 
200 feet of the boundary of its property. CR., pp. 75-78). 
CAG has cited this Court to Paddison Scenic Properties Family Trust LC v. Idaho 
County, 153 Idaho 1,278 P.3d 403 (2012). As noted in that case, there was no present need for 
an adjudication because the parties all agreed that the public enjoyed access over the roadway at 
issue, and there was no disputed issue regarding its maintenance. The instant case is 
distinguishable from Paddison simply because CAG's initial letter, coupled with the legal 
arguments in its Brief regarding the alleged unenforceability of the Option Agreement 
covenants, has created real and substantial uncertainty for ABC. As stated by this Court in 
Sweeney v. America National Bank, et al., 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 (1941) (overruled on 
other grounds): 



























It was held in Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F.2d 
234 [(8th Cir. 1940)] as follows: "The Declaratory Judgment Act 
must be liberally construed to attain its objective, which is to 
expedite and simplify the ascertainment of uncertain rights." 
62 Idaho at p. 550. 
CAG continues to assert that because it has not yet breached the covenant in the 
Agreement, this case must therefore be considered as not being ripe for adjudication. If that 
were truly the legal litmus test, it is submitted that the Idaho legislature would never have 
adopted the following language in Idaho Code § 10-1203: 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a 
breach thereof. 
ABC did nothing to create the controversy in the instant case. Given the language in the Option 
Agreement, and the express definition given to the term "healthcare facilities" by its own 
attorneys, the last thing ABC expected from CAG was the letter dated February 9, 2012. 
However, CAG's response to ABC's letter clearly served as the basis for the creation of the 
requisite uncertainty to pass the ripeness test. When CAG asserted additional legal issues in its 
briefs as contained in the record, it only served to bolster the need for judicial adjudication. 
C. ABC's Claim is not Predicated on Hypothetical Facts. 
Far from being hypothetical, this case presents a definite and concrete controversy. If, as 
CAG stated in its letter, the letter should not be construed as agreeing with ABC's position 
regarding the enforceability of the covenant, the only thing left is the converse, i.e., that CAG 
did not agree with ABC's position. It would seem an utter futility to have to wait until an actual 
breach occurred which would necessitate the filing of a temporary restraining order or 



























preliminary injunction. Nothing at all is to be gained by putting off until tomorrow that which 
should be decided today. Deciding this case now will bring certainty for ABC relative to the 
enforceability of the restrictive covenant language. Furthermore, it will bring certainty to CAG 
with regard to the merger issue it has asserted, as well as CAG's continuing ability to enforce 
certain other restrictive covenants within 200 feet of its properties (See R., p. 75-77). If ever 
there was a need to have a contract construed under the Declaratory Judgment Act prior to the 
time of a breach, this appeal certainly presents such a case. Putting off the decision today will 
only delay the inevitable. 
D. Contrary to CAG's Assertion, the Option Agreement is not a Matter of Public 
Record. 
In footnote 4 at page 19 of its Brief, CAG has asserted, ipse dixit, that the Option 
Agreement is a matter of public record, and that prospective purchasers of property in the 
Crossroads Point Business Center PUD could satisfy themselves regarding CAG's contentions 
simply by reviewing the Agreement. ABC is unaware of any public record in Jerome County or 
elsewhere where the Option Agreement would be included. Although a Memorandum of 
Option Agreement was recorded in Jerome County (R., p. 54), there is no evidence whatsoever 
to support CAG's assertion that the Agreement itself is a matter of public record. Even if it was 
a public record, which it is not, a prospective purchaser would never have any way of knowing 
CAG's potential disagreement with the restrictive covenant, the merger issue, or the claimed 
right of CAG to enforce other restrictive covenants within 200 feet of the boundaries of its 
property. On the one hand, CAG asserts that the issue raised by ABC is not ripe for 



























adjudication. On the other hand, CAG asserts that there are contract issues regarding the merger 
doctrine and its claimed right to enforce certain restrictive covenants on property surrounding 
its property that would require its filing of a cross-claim. It is as if CAG would like to have its 
cake, and eat it too. It seems apparent that CAG believes that it can create impediments for 
ABC solely in an attempt to force ABC into a position where it would have to purchase CAG's 
property in order to resolve matters (See R., p. 77, LL. 14-16). Needless to say, ABC did not 
want to be involved in litigation, but neither did it want to be placed in a position where it faced 
claims from CAG that would impact its ability to market its property to others in the future. 
E. Issues Raised by CAG in its Reply Memorandum only Bolster the need for an 
Adjudication in this Case. 
CAG has referred this Court to the decision in Losser, supra, which provides that all 
facts and inferences from the record are to be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Even 
though CAG has insisted that all of its briefs to the district court needed to be included in the 
record on appeal of this matter, CAG would now contend that this Court should ignore the 
pages of CAG' s arguments devoted to the following issues of claimed contract uncertainties: 
1. Does the doctrine of merger apply in this case? 
2. Can CAG enforce its right not to have any property 
adjacent to, or within 200 feet of, its three lots developed except in 
accordance with uses specifically identified in the Option 
Agreement? 
3. Is the expiration language in the Supplemental Declaration 
(R., p. 42) inconsistent with the Option Agreement? (See R., p. 76, 
footnote 1). 
CAG acknowledged in its brief that these issues would compel it, "at a minimum to cross-claim 



























to clarify these rights if this litigation goes forward." CR., p. 78). The fact that the record 
establishes CAG's stated need to file a cross-claim in this case only substantiates that which 
ABC has asserted from the outset, i.e., this matter is not only ripe for adjudication, but the 
uncertainty espoused by both parties relative to the contractual document begs for a resolution. 
CAG's underlying motive is expressly stated in its Reply Memorandum as follows: 
ABC can essentially unwind the transaction and have complete 
control over the subject property by exercising its option to 
purchase all three lots for the same price that St. Benedict's paid for 
the single lot. 
CR., p. 77). While such a resolution sounds deceptively tempting, it does not mean that it is 
viable. If "A" possessed an option to purchase "B's" property for $100, and "B's" property was 
only worth $50 at the time the option was exercisable, "A" would most likely refrain from 
exercising its option. Similarly, if "A" only possessed $50, and could not somehow obtain the 
balance, "A" would not be in a position to exercise its option. This appeal does not tum on the 
ability or desirability of ABC exercising its option. Rather, this appeal turns on the need for 
adjudication of all the issues at the present time, coupled with the reality that nothing will be 
gained or materially added by deferring the adjudication until a later date. 
F. Attorney Fees. 
The argument regarding attorney fees has been discussed in ABC's opening Brief. ABC 
would be hard-pressed to disagree with CAG's statement in its Respondent's Brief at pp. 19-20, 
except to say that if this Court reverses the decision, ABC would be the prevailing party on 
appeal, and the award of attorney fees at the district court would necessarily have to be vacated. 




























ABC agrees with CAG that the parties should not be forced to litigate. But for the 
response of CAG to ABC's letter, ABC would not find itself in this position. There is no need to 
await a breach of the restrictive covenant before a judicial determination is made on the issue as 
asserted by ABC, and as compounded by the assertion made by CAG that it would be forced to 
file a cross-claim to litigate the issues it believes outstanding with regard to the Option 
Agreement. 
When the Idaho legislature adopted Idaho Code § 10-1203, it clearly contemplated that 
there would be situations where a contract would need to be construed before a breach has 
occurred. This is one of those situations. Resolving the parties' multiple uncertainties regarding 
the Option Agreement at this time will only serve to afford both of them relief from uncertainty 
and controversy in the future. The district court will be in no better position than it is now to 
decide the questions presented. As such, the district court's decision should be reversed with the 
award of costs and attorney fees to CAG being vacated. Costs and attorney fees should be 
awarded to ABC as the prevailing party pursuant to the terms of the Option Agreement and 
LA.R. Rules 40 and 41. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /6#day of February, 2014. 
ROBERTSON &, SLETTE, PLLC 
BY: __ :..c,.L---+_-\-~ ___ _ 
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